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 Abstract 
 
Accountability is a crucial element of governance. Non-profit organisations are 
typically accountable to multiple stakeholders and often ‘do’ accountability in 
multiple ways. But what happens when a non-profit organisation is highly dependent 
on a single source of funding? This paper provides an empirical exploration of this 
issue. It draws on a longitudinal case study of one non-profit organisation in the UK 
that is highly dependent on a single funder to examine how accountability is 
constructed and enacted, with a focus on the board. It critically examines 
accountability processes through direct observation of board and committee meetings 
and in-depth interviews with board members. The analysis shows how board 
members work to construct broader forms of accountability beyond accountability to 
the funder, but then struggle to enact them. This paper provides in-depth insight into 
the challenges that non-profit board members face and offers a rare example of 
observational research on board behaviour. 
  
 Introduction 
 
Accountability is a crucial element of governance. Indeed, ever since Berle and 
Means (1932) identified the separation of ownership and control, much of the 
prescriptive literature on governance has been concerned with how organisations can 
be held accountable. Agency theory, which is still predominant in corporate 
governance research, focuses on how boards of directors should act to monitor the 
decision-making and performance of executive staff (Fama & Jansen, 1983); and 
governance reforms, which often follow high-profile corporate failures, typically 
stress internal and external accountability mechanisms (Roberts, McNulty, & Stiles, 
2005). 
 
In non-profit governance, accountability is particularly crucial. This is due to some 
basic characteristics of non-profit organisations, including multiple organisational 
objectives, multiple stakeholders and a diversified (i.e. voluntary and professional) 
workforce (Alexander, Brudney, & Yang, 2010; Coule, 2015). But it is also due to 
some more recent developments in many countries, including the rise of ‘new public 
management’, which has led to the introduction of an ‘audit culture’ (Alexander et al., 
2010; Guo, 2007; Ospina, Diaz, & O’Sullivan, 2002), and the ‘hollowing out of the 
state’, which has seen the awarding of public service contracts to non-profit 
organisations (Ferlie & McGivern, 2013).  
 
These more recent developments have meant that, in the UK and elsewhere, 
government funding is now a significant source of income for many non-profit 
organisations. This, in turn, has raised concerns about the independence of the 
 voluntary sector. For example, in the UK, the Baring Foundation (2014) recently 
reported that the independence of the voluntary sector was ‘undervalued and under 
threat’. Such concerns echo those raised in the US in the 1990s, when it was claimed 
that many non-profit organisations were moving from ‘agents of the community’ to 
‘agents of government’ (Smith & Lipsky, 1993, p. 72). 
 
In this context, it is particularly important to understand how non-profit organisations 
deal with issues of accountability. Recent research has offered detailed typologies of 
accountability (e.g. Christensen & Ebrahim, 2006; Ebrahim, 2010; Knutsen & 
Brower, 2010), as well as critical analysis of the theoretical assumptions underpinning 
different views of accountability (Coule, 2015) and discussion of possible managerial 
strategies for balancing multiple accountabilities (Knutsen & Brower, 2010). This has 
provided a solid foundation. However, there is more we need to know. 
 
First, we need to know how non-profit organisations that are almost entirely 
dependent on a single, public funder deal with accountability. Are they, as Smith and 
Lipsky (1993) foretold, ‘agents of government’? Second, we need to know what is 
happening at board level. How do board members, individually and collectively, deal 
with issues of accountability on a day-to-day basis? Third, we need to better 
understand the differences between constructing and enacting accountability. While 
recent studies have used interviews to gain valuable insight into how organisational 
members deal with accountability issues, there are always important differences 
between what people say they do and what they actually do. We need to better 
understand, through direct observation, how board members construct and enact 
accountability in ongoing processes of discussion and decision-making. 
  
This article seeks to develop knowledge of these issues through a longitudinal case 
study of a non-profit sport organisation in the UK that is highly dependent on a single, 
public funder. In examining this case, the article seeks to contribute to the theory and 
practice of accountability in non-profit organisations and to demonstrate the 
importance of adopting a multi-level, process-based perspective on governance 
(Cornforth, 2012). The article is structured as follows. The next section discusses key 
issues in accountability research. Following this, we describe and justify our 
methodological approach. Then, we present our findings, focusing on how board 
members constructed and enacted (or failed to enact) different types of accountability. 
We then examine the implications of the study and draw conclusions. 
 
Accountability and governance research 
 
Accountability is often defined simply as the way in which an organisation is held to 
account for its actions. However, research has shown that it is much more complex 
than this. Indeed, Dubnick and Yang (2011, p. 179) argue that ‘the promiscuity, 
multifunctionality, polymorphism, and situatedness of accountability make it one of 
the most elusive concepts in public administration’. Rather than talking about 
accountability per se, researchers argue that we need to talk about multiple types of 
accountability (Knutsen & Brower, 2010). In the non-profit governance literature, 
therefore, a number of authors have offered typologies of accountability. For 
example, Kearns (1994) identified four types of accountability, based on explicit or 
implicit performance standards and proactive or reactive organisational responses; 
and other authors have offered typologies focusing on: relationships with different 
 stakeholder groups (Ebrahim, 2003); ‘upward’, ‘downward’, or ‘lateral’ 
accountability (Christensen & Ebrahim, 2006; Edwards & Hulme, 1996); and 
‘instrumental’ and ‘expressive’ accountability (Knutsen & Brower, 2010). 
 
Such typologies are useful, because they can help us to understand the nature of the 
accountability challenges that non-profit organisations face. In particular, as the ‘audit 
culture’ becomes more deeply embedded (Alexander et al., 2010), it is increasingly 
important to understand whether, and if so, how, non-profit organisations ‘do’ 
accountability when they are very highly dependent on public funding. In this context, 
Christensen and Ebrahim’s (2006) argument that upward accountability (to funders, 
donors and oversight agencies) can often crowd out downward and lateral 
accountability (to communities and staff) is particularly relevant. Likewise, Knutsen 
and Brower’s (2010) argument that instrumental accountability, underpinned by 
principal-agent relationships, mutual benefits, resource dependence and measurable 
outcomes, can impinge on expressive accountability, based on values and beliefs and 
a sense of shared ownership. Coule (2015) extends such arguments by examining how 
the underlying assumptions of different theories of governance hold implications for 
the theory and practice of accountability. Specifically, she identifies how the unitary 
logic that underpins agency and stewardship theory emphasises a systems-control 
approach that privileges instrumental accountability, whereas the pluralist logic that 
underpins stakeholder and democratic theory emphasises a process-relational 
approach that allows for forms of expressive accountability. In a very basic sense, 
then, current research suggests a potential conflict between upward, instrumental 
accountability and other types of downward and/or expressive accountability. 
 
 It is also important to examine the mechanisms through which non-profit 
organisations enact (or might seek to enact) accountability. For example, Ebrahim 
(2010) sets out five common accountability mechanisms, namely: reports and 
disclosure statements; evaluations and performance assessments; industry self-
regulation; participation; and adaptive learning. While this serves as a useful 
summary of common approaches, it looks at these mechanisms from quite a 
‘distance’. That is, while the mechanisms imply micro-level interaction, they do not 
specify clearly how organisational members actually construct and enact 
accountability in ongoing processes of discussion and decision-making. As Roberts et 
al. (2005) found, in their research on non-executive directors in FTSE 350 companies, 
‘in practice, accountability is realized through a wide range of behaviours – 
challenging, questioning, probing, discussing, testing, informing, debating and 
exploring’ (Roberts et al., 2005, p. S12). The key implication here is that if we want 
to understand how organisations actually ‘do’ accountability, we need to observe and 
interpret ongoing processes of board discussion and decision-making. 
 
In fact, this is part of a wider methodological debate within governance research, 
concerning the way in which empirical work is carried out. Governance research has 
traditionally been somewhat ‘distant’ from its objects of inquiry, relying on 
quantitative analysis of cross-sectional data (Brennan and Solomon, 2008; Cornforth, 
2012; Leblanc and Schwartz, 2007; Roberts et al., 2005). Yet if we understand 
governance as, at least in part, the decisions of groups of board members, it is surely 
important to understand how and why board members make those decisions. As 
Leblanc and Schwartz (2007, p. 843) argue, we need to ‘open up the black box of 
governance process’. They advocate interviews, observations and documentary 
 analysis, within an interpretive research paradigm, as potential ways of accessing an 
‘insider perspective’ – an approach that some recent studies on non-profit 
accountability have embraced (e.g. Coule, 2015; Knutsen and Brower, 2010). 
 
We follow this interpretive approach, but seek to build on these studies in three ways. 
First, given the recent developments within many countries’ non-profit sectors, we 
seek to understand how organisations that are very highly dependent on a single, 
public funder ‘do’ accountability. While previous research (e.g. Coule, 2015) has 
involved organisations that had various levels of dependence on public funding, we 
deliberately adopt a ‘critical case’ approach (Yin, 2014) by seeking to gain an in-
depth understanding of accountability within an organisation that is almost entirely 
dependent on a single, public funder. 
 
Second, we focus specifically on the board. As the board is the key decision-making 
entity within a non-profit organisation (Herman and Renz, 2008), it is essential to 
understand how board members deal with accountability. While Knutsen and Brower 
(2010) examined mechanisms of accountability, they focused specifically on 
managers and staff, and while Coule (2015) incorporated more of a focus on the 
board, she did not report, from longitudinal observation, how board members dealt 
with accountability issues within board discussions and decision-making processes. 
We seek to do so through direct observation of board and committee meetings, in 
order to try to trace how board members ‘do’ accountability over time. 
 
Third, and related, we examine how board members both construct and enact 
accountability. Previous research on board-level accountability within an interpretive 
 paradigm has tended to rely on interviews and documentary analysis (Coule, 2015; 
Roberts et al., 2005). In this study, we observed board and committee meetings 
directly, over a sustained period, as well as conducting in-depth interviews, in order to 
understand not only how board members constructed accountability within 
interviews, but also how they constructed and enacted (or did not enact) 
accountability within ongoing processes of discussion and decision-making. In so 
doing, we aim to contribute to the emerging ‘process perspective’ on governance, 
which, among other things, seeks ‘narrative explanations of how change happens in 
terms of the central actors involved’ (Cornforth, 2012: 1127). 
 
Methodology 
 
In seeking to address our main research question – how is accountability constructed 
and enacted within boards of non-profit organisations that are very highly dependent 
on a single, public funder? – we required a case study organisation that was funded in 
this way and would provide access to board and committee meetings. At a launch 
event for a survey of non-profit governance, we met one of the chief executive 
officers (CEOs) of an organisation that met our ‘funding criteria’ and, following 
various negotiations, the organisation generously granted us access. 
 
The case 
 
The case is a national governing body of sport (NGB) in England. It was formed in 
2000 and acts as the development agency for two sports. It is legally constituted as a 
company limited by guarantee, with the existing national federations of the two 
 sports, which had previously governed all aspects of their sports, instituted as the 
owners (shareholders) of the focal organisation. However, the organisation is de facto 
non-profit: the shareholders do not take any dividends from the focal organisation and 
any revenue generated is used to meet its sporting objectives. The board of the 
organisation has 12 members: an independent chair; six federation directors (each 
federation elects three directors to the board); and five independent directors. In 
addition, the organisation has two CEOs, who attend the board (technically as non-
voting members, but, in practice, as full board members). 
 
The organisation receives funding through Sport England, which is the non-
departmental public body that distributes funding from central government and the 
National Lottery to support community-level sport in England. Every four years, the 
organisation, along with other NGBs in England, bid to Sport England for Whole 
Sport Plan funding. Bid documents set out: (i) targets the organisation seeks to meet 
(relating to numbers of participants in the sports, numbers of leagues, teams, coaches, 
and so on); (ii) how the organisation seeks to meet these targets; and (iii) how much 
funding the organisation is requesting. The organisation had successfully bid for 
Whole Sport Plan funding in this way since 2005 (see Figure 1) and was very highly 
dependent on this source of income. 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
Data Collection 
 
We sought to understand accountability processes by collecting and interpreting data 
 from a number of sources (see Table 1). 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
Each meeting we observed lasted around two hours, except for two longer, six-hour 
board meetings, so the total length of observation was around 36 hours. We wrote 
field notes during and immediately after the meetings, seeking to preserve the ‘flow’ 
of conversation and interaction, and, where possible, we recorded phrases and 
conversational exchanges verbatim. Interviews ranged from 60 to 115 minutes, with 
an average length of 80 minutes. We digitally recorded them and then transcribed 
them in full. We then imported these transcriptions, along with our written-up and 
annotated field notes and the various board documents we were given, into NVivo. 
 
We collected data in two main phases. During the initial data collection phase, we 
first read all the organisational documents to develop our understanding of the history 
of the organisation and then conducted a semi-structured interview with one of the 
CEOs, in order to deepen our understanding of the organisation and to probe how (she 
thought) the board and committees operated and how board members constructed and 
enacted accountability. We then began our observations of board and committee 
meetings in November 2011 and continued these until February 2013 (see Figure 2). 
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
After gaining a good (provisional) understanding from our observations of how the 
board operated and how accountability issues played out, we then, from February 
 2012 onwards, conducted a further six interviews – with the chair, the other CEO, a 
federation director, an independent director, a Governance Committee member and a 
senior staff member – in order to probe how they perceived that they (and others) 
constructed and enacted accountability. We used a basic interview guide (developed 
through our reading of the literature on non-profit accountability discussed earlier) 
and we also used the interviews to ‘test’ and refine our emerging interpretations from 
our observations. We asked interviewees directly about how they responded to 
different stakeholder groups (e.g. how did they interpret and seek to meet the 
expectations of Sport England, the national federations, the wider members, staff, and 
so on). We also asked them to reflect critically on the conversations held during board 
meetings and the ways in which they and other board members talked and made 
decisions. In this sense, we asked both directly and indirectly about accountability. 
 
Together, the interviews and observations worked iteratively to focus our attention on 
key accountability issues. For example, our early observations from meetings 
indicated that all board members were constructing a shared sense of (expressive) 
accountability to ‘the sports’, but, over time, the interviews and observations 
suggested that different board members were constructing this accountability in subtly 
divergent ways. As will be discussed below, this mainly involved certain board 
members constructing ‘the sports’ as the national federations themselves (i.e. the 
organisations and their official membership) and certain other board members 
constructing ‘the sports’ in a more diffuse way that centred on the focal organisation’s 
wider vision and mission. This is reflected in the coding scheme (Figure 3 below), 
where ‘Constructing accountability to ‘the sports’’ is subdivided into ‘Constructing 
accountability to vision and mission’ and ‘Constructing accountability to the 
 federations’. 
 
We then conducted a preliminary data analysis (see details below) and returned to the 
field in January 2014 to undertake further interviews with the joint CEOs (together), 
two independent directors and a federation director (these latter three for the first 
time). The main purpose of these interviews was to ‘try out’ and refine our 
understanding of accountability processes and to probe further the tensions and 
contradictions our reading of the data indicated. For example, we had directly 
observed the development of an organisational vision and mission, but it seemed, to 
us, that the desire for tangible action around this had ebbed somewhat over time. Our 
interviewees broadly confirmed this (and our other provisional interpretations), but 
also provided further detail, which deepened our understanding of the case. After the 
four interviews in this second phase, we felt confident in the ‘confirmability’ of our 
findings and, as much as this is ever possible, we felt we had reached ‘data saturation’ 
around the main research issue. 
 
Data analysis 
 
We initially coded all the data according to a very basic, pre-specified coding scheme, 
drawing on Cornforth’s (2001) list of typical non-profit board ‘processes’ and 
‘functions’ to provide an overall picture of how the board operated. In doing so, we 
predictably coded a significant amount of data to ‘Ensuring accountability to the 
organisation's stakeholders’. We then developed a more refined coding scheme, 
coding material initially to the broad categories of ‘Accountability tensions’, 
‘Constructing accountability’ and ‘Enacting accountability’, which provided the basic 
 outline of our narrative. Then, as we proceeded iteratively through the data collection 
and analysis, we developed a more refined coding scheme. There is not sufficient 
space here to explain the entire coding process, but we present a simplified version of 
the coding scheme in Figure 3. 
 
[Figure 3 here] 
 
As is common in analysis of qualitative data, we also sought to examine the inter-
connections within the data. We seek to present these in the following narrative and to 
capture them, as much as this is possible, in the process model that follows the 
narrative. 
 
Findings 
 
Dependence on a single, public funder 
 
The organisation was highly dependent on funding from Sport England. Between 
2009 and 2013, it received £2.7 million through Whole Sport Plan funding, which 
accounted for approximately 83% of total income. This high level of dependence 
clearly shaped the ways in which board members constructed and enacted 
accountability. For example, in the very first meeting we attended – the Annual 
General Meeting in November 2011 – the outgoing chair started his final address by 
declaring, ‘We’re thought of very well by Sport England’. He then identified the next 
round of Whole Sport Plan funding as ‘the critical issue for the organisation going 
forward’. The new chair clearly recognised it too. He said, in his interview, reflecting 
 on the organisation’s position, ‘It’s almost as if we’re an agency of Sport England’. 
 
Accountability tensions 
 
This dominant, upward accountability created certain tensions. As one of the CEOs 
said in her interview, ‘we deliver Sport England targets’, and this meant that she and 
other board members felt somewhat constrained in their ability to be accountable to 
‘the sports’: 
 
… you know…the message from Sport England is that you should first think about what 
would be good for your sport. And then, you know, they should see what parts of that strategy 
they would fund. …in truth, we can’t operate like that. We first think about what they’re 
willing to fund and, you know,…and obviously, we’re not talking about things that are 
diametrically opposed to what would be good for our sports, but yeah, we would probably do 
things slightly differently if it was all about what we thought was best for [the sports].  
 
These ‘accountability tensions’ also played out between the board and staff and 
within the board itself. For example, the other CEO said in his interview: 
 
There’s often a frustration among staff when they would like to be doing something, whether 
it’s coaching in schools, “Our focus can’t be youths, it’s adults,” you know, that kind of thing, 
or national team support, which we’re not funded for at all. And I know our staff are often 
frustrated that that’s not what we’re doing. And I think our representative [board] members 
are often frustrated that that’s not what we’re doing, whereas our independent [board] 
members are very kind of clear on the fact that’s not what we’re paid to do [by Sport 
England].  
 
 So, how did the board deal with these accountability tensions? 
 
Constructing a broader sense of accountability 
 
Many board members, while recognising the organisation’s dependence on grant 
funding, sought to construct a broader sense of accountability. For example, in the 
November 2011 board meeting, the new chair encouraged all board members to think 
about ‘what we want to achieve for our sports’ and then to think about how ‘we can 
get Sport England on board with what we want to achieve’. He drew an analogy 
between the organisation and a car, which, he said, they (the board) had designed and 
should continue to design, he (the chair) should drive, and into which Sport England 
should put the fuel. He made this argument persistently in board meetings. For 
example, in a board meeting a year later, he said, ‘It has felt that we’re just an agency 
for Sport England. But … this is now our opportunity…if Sport England want to 
come and invest in what we’re doing, that’s what we should be aiming at…It’s a 
different model for me mentally, and I think it’s important that people have this 
different mental model.’ 
 
But what was this different ‘mental model’? Initially, it seemed there was a general 
consensus, in which board members and the joint CEOs contrasted the upward, 
instrumental accountability to Sport England with a broader sense of accountability to 
‘the sports’. For example, in the November 2011 board meeting, the chair made the 
point that, ‘Ultimately, all of this is about what works best for [the sports], not for any 
one body’. Likewise, one of the independent directors, in the same board meeting, 
emphasised that all board discussions should be framed by an understanding that 
 ‘sport owns the sport’. This accountability to ‘the sports’ appeared to align with what 
Knutsen and Brower (2010) describe as expressive accountability to the community – 
‘organizations’ self-perception of their community roles, often altruistic and value 
driven’ (p. 597) and what Christensen and Ebrahim (2006) term ‘downward 
accountability’ – a sense of ‘felt responsibility’ to clients, members, or the public. 
 
Close observation, however, suggested that this accountability to ‘the sports’ was in 
fact constructed in different ways by different people. Some – primarily the chair, the 
other independent directors and the joint CEOs – tended to discuss it in terms of 
accountability to the organisation’s vision and mission. For example, when discussing 
how the board should account for its actions in the November 2011 board meeting, 
one of the independent directors, said, ‘I want to say, “where’s the sport in 2017 or 
2020?”’ In a later board meeting (November 2012), the chair discussed a ‘layered’ 
approach to thinking about the board and its accountability. He talked about a ‘top 
layer, which is the organisation’s vision and mission’ and ‘another layer beneath that, 
which is the Whole Sport Plan and the Development and Strategy Committee’. ‘We 
have to remember,’ he said, ‘that the Whole Sport Plan is not all our work’ – an 
explicit statement that upward, instrumental accountability ought to be balanced with 
a broader sense of accountability to vision and mission. 
 
Others – primarily the federations’ representative board members – emphasised 
accountability towards the two federations. One of the federation directors sketched 
out this basic position in the January 2012 Governance Committee meeting. He 
explained that many people within the federations ‘see [the organisation] as their 
organisation’. ‘They set up the organisation.’ While he was not stating this as his 
 personal position, he was nevertheless expressing a strong sense among a few board 
members of accountability to the federations. In practice, this referred to the way in 
which the organisation should consult with and/or justify its actions to the federations; 
and this was a persistent source of conflict within board debate. Indeed, it was 
discussed (or, sometimes, deliberately skirted around) in nearly every board and 
committee meeting and in every interview. As one of the federation directors said in 
the April 2012 Governance Committee meeting, referring to the relationship between 
the focal organisation and the federations, ‘If you want to get an elephant and blow it 
up, we can fill the room with it’. 
 
Enacting, or seeking to enact, accountability 
 
So, the process of constructing a broader sense of accountability constituted ongoing 
‘work’ that board members did; and, where they constructed it in divergent ways, it 
also constituted ongoing accountability tension. But how did board members actually 
enact accountability? First, and most obviously, they enacted accountability to Sport 
England through the Whole Sport Plan funding process. Every four years, the 
organisation would submit a detailed funding bid to Sport England and then monitor 
and periodically report their outcomes. The board monitored progress through a 
‘balanced scorecard’ that they examined at each board meeting. For example, at the 
November 2011 board meeting, one of the CEOs presented the most recent figures on 
participation, drawn from the national ‘Active People’ survey. He noted that the 
figures were ‘downward’. One of the independent directors immediately questioned 
whether this was ‘a blip, or a trend’; and there followed a detailed, 25-minute 
discussion about the figures. There was clear recognition from all the board members 
 that Sport England placed real emphasis on these figures. As one of the independent 
board members said, ‘It’s the only measure!’ 
 
The board also enacted accountability to Sport England in other ways that were not 
immediately related to the Whole Sport Plan funding process. For example, in the 
November 2011 board meeting, the chair asked one of the joint CEOs a series of 
precise questions about a sum of money left over from a capital project that the CEO 
had allocated to some sports clubs. The chair said he wanted to ‘demonstrate due 
process’. ‘If Sport England are looking for an audit trail,’ he said, ‘is there a problem 
with this being the fifth bullet point on a relatively insignificant looking report?’ The 
tone of the questioning was not aggressive, but it was certainly robust. There were 
countless examples like this of the board making decisions in the light of what board 
members knew, or presumed, that Sport England would sanction. 
 
But what of the broader forms of accountability that board members were working to 
construct in ongoing board discussions? Here, close observation indicated that board 
members certainly sought to enact these broader forms of accountability. For 
example, between November 2011 and March 2012, the organisation developed and 
agreed a vision and mission. This involved initial discussions at the November 2011 
board meeting, the establishment of a small working group (comprising the chair, one 
of the CEOs and one of the independent directors), feedback from board members to 
this group in the six weeks after the meeting, the development of specific proposals 
by the working group, discussion of these proposals at the February 2012 board 
meeting, consultation with staff and eventual agreement at the March 2012 board 
meeting. 
  
The process of decision-making here, as with other important issues, involved a series 
of group discussions among all board members and the CEOs, in which they all 
questioned, challenged, probed and informed one another. There were numerous 
examples of this, but the discussion at the February 2012 board meeting illustrates it 
as well as any: 
 
 Independent director 1 poses a series of clear, direct questions about the proposed mission. He 
talks about ‘drivers of participation’ and gives specific examples from other non-profit sport 
organisations that he works with.  
 Federation director 1 agrees. He worries that people are too internally focused. 
 Independent director 2: ‘Actually, maybe not that many people outside the organisation will 
read this.’ He links the vision and mission to the Whole Sport Plan and argues for balance: 
‘Although this is external, how external is it?’ 
 CEO 1 stresses the importance of clarity around the main aim. Should it be to increase 
participation or not? 
 A broader discussion takes place, involving the chair, both CEOs and the other directors. They 
debate a number of relevant issues, including: who the vision/mission is for; what links there 
are between different aspects (e.g., elite sport performance and general sports participation); 
and different possible interpretations of the words in the vision and mission. 
 
Once the vision and mission had been decided, the chair then periodically invoked it, 
in board and committee meetings, as a means of ensuring a broader sense of 
accountability. For example, in the November 2012 board meeting, one of the CEOs 
brought up the issue of where the organisation’s priorities should lie. She said, ‘My 
angst is getting an email saying, “We’re running this coaching clinic, how much can 
you fund?” And this is not part of an overall, coherent strategy around, you know, but 
 more splintered…’ The chair replied, ‘It comes back to the vision and mission, really, 
which we’ve drawn broadly enough…It allows us to hold something up to it and see 
whether it helps us.’ In this sense, the board sought to enact accountability to its 
vision and mission – a kind of downward and/or lateral form of accountability – 
through formally developing a shared vision and mission and referencing it in 
ongoing discussions. 
 
The board also sought to enact accountability to the federations. It did this in two 
main ways. First, as noted above, each federation had three director positions on the 
board of the organisation. The original principle of this was to ensure accountability 
to the federations through direct representation. Second, in a more informal, ongoing 
way, the chair and other board members regularly sought the ‘federation view’ within 
board discussions. For example, at the February 2012 board meeting, when one of the 
joint CEOs was discussing the proposed timeline around the Whole Sport Plan 
funding bid, the chair turned to one of the federation directors and said, ‘What’s the 
federation perspective on all this?’ The federation director then discussed what ‘his’ 
federation members thought about the whole funding bid process, including the 
proposed timeline. This pattern was common in board and committee meetings 
throughout our observations. 
 
Issues with seeking to enact a broader sense of accountability 
 
So, the board sought to enact, in various ways, the broader forms of accountability it 
constructed. However, a number of issues hampered, or subverted, these attempts. 
First, in relation to vision and mission, while the board members (the chair especially) 
 periodically invoked vision and mission as an alternative to the upward, instrumental 
accountability to Sport England, our observations showed that the very process of 
developing and agreeing  the vision and mission was closely intertwined with this 
upward, instrumental accountability. For example, the timetable around developing an 
organisational vision and mission (outlined above) was explicitly pegged to Sport 
England’s four-year funding cycle. As the independent director who chaired the 
Development and Strategy Committee told the other board members at the November 
2011 board meeting, ‘We need this input [on vision and mission] by the next board, 
because we need it for the Whole Sport Plan’. Even more fundamentally, the actual 
process of decision-making was directly influenced by expectations about what Sport 
England would support. As just one example, when introducing possible visions and 
missions at the February 2012 board meeting, the joint CEO based his initial 
discussion around ‘the three Ps – participation, performance and profile’. Both the 
chair and one of the federation directors immediately asked whether this was 
language used and understood by Sport England. ‘It helps,’ the federation director 
said wryly, ‘if your main funder speaks your language.’ 
 
The second issue was that not all organisational members were involved in the 
discussions around vision and mission, or happy about their outcome. One of the staff 
members said: ‘It was a kind of fait accompli really, because the board had decided 
pretty much this is our mission and vision. It was communicated to staff [and the] 
staff [were] kind of like, “Why is that our mission and vision?” You know, “Why 
should our organisation be just about what Sport England wants?”’ In this sense, the 
process of developing an organisational vision and mission, which was conceptualised 
as a means of enacting a broader sense of accountability, was perceived, at least by 
 some staff members, as reinforcing the very upward, instrumental accountability it 
was intended to balance. Third, it was apparent from later board and committee 
meetings that board members and staff were not completely clear on what the vision 
and mission actually were. For example, at the start of the May 2012 board meeting, 
the chair pointed out that he had put the vision and mission on the wall of the 
boardroom, but said, chuckling, ‘Even I couldn’t remember it the other day’.  While 
this is no doubt common in many organisations, it raises a clear issue about how 
accountability to organisational vision and mission can really function as a counter-
weight to upward, instrumental accountability to a principal funder. 
 
The fourth, more practical, but arguably more significant, issue was that the board had 
not embedded its vision and mission into ongoing board practices – in particular, into 
the formal process through which it assessed performance. The key evidence for this 
was that vision and mission had not been incorporated into the ‘balanced scorecard’. 
One of the independent directors discussed this in his interview; he said: ‘I feel that 
[the vision and mission] was done, moved on and it doesn't feel like it's discussed 
again, like we did that. And then, well…are we very focused on working towards that 
vision in everything that we do? I don't think necessarily we are’. 
 
There were also a number of issues with the board’s attempts to enact accountability 
to the federations. First, in regard to electing federation directors, a number of board 
members felt that many within the federations lacked the time, experience and/or 
commitment to act as a director. For example, at the January 2012 Governance 
Committee meeting, when mentioning that one of federations still had two of their 
three director positions vacant, one of the CEOs said, ‘As I’ve said before, the issue is 
 can we get people with appropriate skills?’ There followed a brief discussion about 
the persistent lack of suitable candidates from the federations. The chair of the 
committee joked (but seriously), ‘Usually, it’s the person out of the room at the time 
that gets voted in’. The CEO picked this up in her interview. She said: 
 
I think quite often, [the federation directors] have no sense of the commitment that’s being 
asked of them. And when they do, it’s…it’s massive overkill from what they expected in a 
sense, because they already have their six to eight board meetings a year as part of the 
federation. 
 
Second, many board members felt the common practice of seeking the ‘federation 
view’ in board and committee meetings created a serious conflict of interest. As one 
of the independent directors said in her interview, ‘It’s a bugbear of mine…there’s 
tends to be an awful lot of sitting in a board meeting, going, “What does [the 
federation] think?” I’m like, “Guys, you’re not here as a director for [the federation], 
you’re here as a director for [the focal organisation].”’ This issue emerged repeatedly 
in interviews. For example, one of the CEOs said: 
 
I think there are points where it’s not clear to people who sit on the board as representative 
members which hat they should be wearing, whether their first concern should be their sport 
or whether they’re there for the good of [the organisation]. …. I mean, we can say right now 
in this room you guys need to be concerned with [the organisation], but that’s not…it’s not 
something people can necessarily easily do. 
 
This constituted another significant accountability tension that the board collectively 
struggled to deal with. Fundamentally, the norm of seeking the ‘federation view’ in 
meetings reinforced the tension between the broader constructions of accountability 
 discussed earlier, i.e. to the focal organisation’s vision and mission, on the one hand, 
and to the federations, on the other. And while the chair, the other independent 
directors and the CEOs generally constructed accountability in the first way, they 
nevertheless found it difficult to avoid the well-entrenched practice of seeking the 
‘federation view’ in meetings, subverting their own attempts to enact the broader 
sense of accountability (to vision and mission) they constructed. The federation 
directors themselves noted this contradiction. As one said in his interview, 
‘Sometimes, it feels like people talk about the independents and the [federation] reps, 
rather than just talk about board members. So there’s a sort of divide…it’s not on 
purpose, you know what I mean? But people refer to us as that.’ 
 
Summary of the case 
 
So, as the narrative explains, a number of inter-related processes concerning 
accountability occurred during our period of research. First, the very high level of 
financial dependence on one main funder meant that the board had to spend a great 
deal of time enacting upward, instrumental accountability to the funder. This triggered 
certain accountability tensions within the organisation. In order to try to manage these 
tensions, board members, led by the chair, sought to construct a broader sense of 
lateral and downward accountability. While it seemed initially that all board members 
were constructing a similar form of accountability to ‘the sports’, closer observation 
suggested that different groups of board members were constructing this in subtly 
divergent ways. This, in turn, created further accountability tensions. The board also 
sought to enact these more expressive forms of accountability, alongside the upward, 
instrumental accountability they clearly enacted to the main funder. However, there 
 were a number of issues that hampered, or subverted, their attempts to do so. 
Fundamentally, this left the board continually constructing, but struggling to enact, a 
broader sense of accountability. 
 
Theoretical implications 
 
The findings discussed above have a number of theoretical implications. First, they 
provide empirical support for theoretical accounts that stress multiple types of 
accountability (e.g., Christensen & Ebrahim, 2006; Ebrahim, 2003; Edwards & 
Hulme, 1996; Kearns, 1994; Knutsen & Brower, 2010). Board members in the case 
study organisation clearly enacted upward accountability to the main funder 
instrumentally, through writing and submitting funding bid documents, monitoring 
and reporting progress, and so on. However, they also constructed and sought to enact 
other types of more expressive downward and lateral accountability. 
 
Second, the findings show how processes of constructing accountability can differ 
subtly and, moreover, how people can ‘use’ different constructions of accountability. 
As discussed, board members all made regular appeals to ‘the sports’, which at first 
glance appeared to be expressions of what Knutsen and Brower (2010) term 
‘expressive accountability to the community’. However, close analysis revealed that 
some board members used such appeals to emphasise accountability to the federations 
– something much closer to what Knutsen and Brower (2010) term ‘expressive 
accountability to patrons’, who ‘can be part of the community, but...are more 
narrowly specified and direct beneficiaries of the organization’s services and 
activities’ (p. 600). On the other hand, others used such appeals to emphasise the 
 accountability the focal organisation ought to enact towards its wider vision and 
mission – something closer to what Knutsen and Brower (2010) term ‘expressive 
accountability to organisational mission’ (p. 599). In sum, then, while these particular 
findings lend basic support to Knutsen and Brower’s (2010) typology of expressive 
accountability – to (i) the community, (ii) organisational mission and (iii) patrons – 
they suggest that, in practice, the second and third types are more specific ‘forms’ of 
the first. 
 
The third main implication concerns the challenges involved in enacting expressive 
accountability. Previous research has noted that it can be difficult to enact expressive, 
or downward, accountability when an organisation has a dominant funder that 
imposes strong performance metrics (Christensen & Ebrahim, 2006; Knutsen & 
Brower, 2010). Our findings extend this discussion by identifying the specific issues 
board members face and examining how they seek to negotiate them. Two issues are 
particularly noteworthy here. First, when board members sought to develop a vision 
and mission for the organisation that could act as a counter-weight to the narrow, 
upward accountability they enacted to the main funder, they actually framed their 
discussions by reference to what they knew, or presumed, the main funder would 
sanction. Current research suggests that non-profit organisations primarily enact 
upward accountability through ‘tools’ such as disclosure statements, reports and 
performance assessments and that ‘processes’ (e.g. participation and adaptive 
learning), where they occur, tend to underpin downward and/or lateral accountability 
(Ebrahim, 2010). While our study supported this, the findings also indicate that board 
members can enact upward accountability in a more intangible, processual way by 
‘involving the funder’ as a kind of ‘absent-but-crucial’ participant in board 
 discussions and decision-making processes by anticipating what the funder would 
want or allow. Second, when board members sought to enact downward 
accountability by regularly asking for the ‘federation view’ from federation directors, 
they exacerbated the tension between the different forms of downward and lateral 
accountability that different groups of board members constructed. 
 
The fourth main implication concerns the multi-theoretical nature of non-profit 
governance. In examining how board members constructed and sought to enact 
accountability, our analysis focused on the micro-processes of interaction within 
board meetings. This revealed that accountability was constructed and enacted 
through: (i) board members questioning and challenging the CEOs; (ii) board 
members (especially the independents) supporting and advising the CEOs; and (iii) 
board members and the CEOs collectively discussing issues and exchanging expert 
opinions. The first of these micro-processes reflects an agency conception of 
accountability, whereas the second and third reflect a stewardship conception. As the 
narrative above showed, while there was some evidence of the first, the second and 
third were much more common. This is interesting, because it illustrates the multi-
level nature of accountability processes. As noted, the main way in which the 
organisation enacted accountability was upward to the main funder – an agency 
conception of accountability, with a ‘funder-as-principal-and-organisation-as-agent’ 
relationship. But this did not necessarily entail a ‘board-as-principal-and-
management-as-agent’ relationship. Instead, as noted, the board performed a 
predominantly stewardship role. This indicates not only that accountability is a multi-
level phenomenon, but also that understanding accountability (and governance more 
broadly) requires a multi-theoretical perspective (c.f. Cornforth, 2012). In this regard, 
 it is also interesting to consider the way in which key funding bodies are themselves 
accountable – most often, to governments – and how this, in turn, affects processes of 
accountability. Such a discussion was beyond the scope of this article, but Houlihan 
and Green (2009), for example, provide an interesting analysis of the way Sport 
England has to demonstrate accountability to the Government and how this shapes 
networks of relationships within the UK non-profit sport sector. 
 
Methodological implications 
 
The research also has a number of important methodological implications. First, quite 
simply, it illustrates the importance of directly observing micro-processes of 
interaction (i.e. questioning, supporting, advising, discussing, and so on), as this 
allows for a better understanding of how accountability is actually constructed and 
enacted in ongoing board behaviour. Second, it demonstrates how important it is to 
pay close attention to ‘governance talk’. The in-depth, interpretive approach, based on 
repeated observation over time, allowed us to tease apart the different meanings that 
board members attached to identical rhetorical appeals. While typologies provide 
useful frameworks for thinking about accountability, they, by their very nature, de-
emphasise the ambiguity inherent in ongoing processes of social construction. Close 
observation of board behaviour sensitises us to that ambiguity and allows us to 
understand how that ambiguity can shape how and why organisations enact (or do not 
enact) accountability to certain groups. 
 
Third, and related, the research demonstrated the importance of exploring the 
differences between what people say and what they do. In our study, this relates to the 
 discernible differences between how people construct and enact various types of 
accountability and, even more specifically, between what people say they do to enact 
accountability and what they do (or do not do) in practice. Previous interpretive 
studies examining accountability (e.g. Coule, 2015; Roberts et al., 2005) have often 
drawn heavily on interview data. While they have provided valuable insight, some of 
the authors themselves have acknowledged ‘the partial and interested nature of the 
rationalizations offered by directors of their experiences and conduct within boards’ 
(Roberts et al., 2005: S20). While we strongly support the methodological calls for 
more in-depth interviews with board members, we also call for observational 
approaches that allow a deep insight into board behaviour and the opportunity to 
triangulate, or ‘crystallise’ (Richardson, 1994) research findings. 
 
The fourth and final methodological implication is broader and encompasses each of 
those above. It is that we need to adopt a more ‘processual’ approach to research on 
non-profit governance. Governance is, first and foremost, a set of dynamic processes. 
This means: (i) that governance needs to be conceptualised from a process 
perspective; and (ii) that it needs to be empirically examined through processual 
analysis. ‘Process research’ is becoming much more common in a number of sub-
fields within organisation studies, such as strategy, leadership and organisational 
change (c.f. Langley, 2009; Pettigrew, 1997), but it is still rare in governance. We 
argue that governance researchers need to embrace the philosophical insights and 
methodological tools of process research and apply them, where relevant, to their own 
objects of inquiry. It is time to get closer to the action. 
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 Table 1. Data sources 
Observations 
(14 full meetings) 
Interviews 
(11 interviews) 
Documents 
(39 key documents) 
2 Annual General 
Meetings 
6 Board Meetings 
4 Governance 
Committee Meetings 
1 Finance Committee 
Meeting 
1 Development and 
Strategy Committee 
Meeting 
Joint CEO (separate) 
Joint CEO (separate) 
Chair 
3 Independent directors 
2 Federation directors 
Committee member 
Senior staff member 
Joint CEOs (together) 
7 Board agendas (November 
2011 – November 2012) 
7 Sets of board minutes 
(November 2011 – November 
2012) 
10 Sets of committee minutes 
(November 2011 – November 
2012)  
4 Committee reports 
7 Annual accounts (2008 – 2014) 
2 Whole Sport Plans (2009-13 
and 2013-17) 
2 Balanced Scorecards 
 
  
 Figure 1. Timeline of the organisation and periods of research 
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2004 
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England 
2008 
Second 
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England 
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Sport 
England 
2007 
Becomes 
limited 
company 
2005-2009 
First Whole Sport Plan 
funding period 
2009-2013 
Second Whole Sport Plan 
funding period 
2013-2017 
Third Whole Sport Plan funding 
period 
November 2011 –  
February 2013 
First research 
period, 
comprising all 
observations of 
board and 
committee 
meetings and 
seven interviews 
January 2014 –  
June 2014 
Second research 
period, 
comprising four 
interviews 
 Figure 2. Timeline of the observations 
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 Figure 3. Coding scheme 
 
Constructing 
accountability 
Accountability 
tensions 
Enacting /seeking to 
enact accountability 
Challenges to enacting 
accountability 
Constructing 
accountability 
to ‘the sports’ 
Tensions 
between board 
and staff 
Tensions 
between 
independent and 
representative 
board members 
Constructing 
accountability 
to vision and 
mission 
Constructing 
accountability 
to the 
federations 
Accountability 
to Sport 
England 
Accountability 
to vision and 
mission 
Accountability 
to the 
federations 
Vision and mission 
shaped by expectations 
around Sport England 
Not all staff involved in 
vision and mission 
Lack of clarity around 
vision and mission 
Vision and mission not 
embedded in practices 
Concerns over some 
federation directors’ lack 
of time, skills and 
experience 
Conflict of interest for 
federation directors 
Formally 
developing a 
vision and 
mission 
Invoking vision 
and mission in 
meetings 
Formally 
electing 
federation 
directors to the 
board 
Seeking the 
‘federation 
view’ in 
meetings 
Whole Sport 
Plan funding 
process 
‘Consulting’ 
(imagined) 
Sport England 
in meetings 
